Abstract-Given the sensitivity of the potential WSN applications, security emerges as a challenging issue in these networks. Because of the resource limitations, symmetric key establishment is one favorite paradigm for securing WSN. One of the main concerns when designing a key management scheme for WSN is the network scalability. Indeed, the protocol should support a large number of nodes to enable a large scale deployment of the network. In this paper, we propose a new highly scalable key establishment scheme for WSN. For that purpose, we make use, for the first time, of the unital design theory. We show that the basic mapping from unitals to pairwise key establishment allows to achieve an extremely high network scalability while degrading the key sharing probability. Then, we propose a new unital-based key pre-distribution approach which provides high network scalability and good key sharing probability. We conduct analytical analysis to compare our solutions to existing ones, the obtained results show that our approach enhances the network scalability while providing good overall performances. Also, we show that our solutions reduce significantly the storage overhead at equal network size compared to existing solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION Nowadays, wireless sensor networks (WSN) are increasingly used in numerous fields such as military, medical and industrial sectors; they are more and more involved in several sensitive applications which require sophisticated security services [1] . Key management is a corner stone for many security services such as confidentiality and authentication which are required to secure communications in WSN, the establishment of secure links between nodes is then a challenging problem in WSN. Because of resource limitations, symmetric key establishment is one of the most suitable paradigms for securing exchanges in WSN. On the other hand, because of the lack of infrastructure in WSN, we have usually no trusted third party which can attribute pairwise secret keys to neighboring nodes, that is why most existing solutions are based on key pre-distribution.
In this paper, we are interested in particular in the scalability of symmetric key pre-distribution schemes. Existing research works either allow to support a low number a nodes or degrade the other network performances including resiliency, connectivity and storage overhead when the number of nodes is important. In contrast to these solutions, our goal is to enhance the scalability of WSN key management schemes without degrading significantly the other network performances. To achieve this goal, we propose to use, for the first time, the unital design to construct and pre-distribute key rings. First, we explain the unital design and we propose a basic mapping from unitals to key pre-distribution for WSN. We show through analytical analysis that the resulting scheme allows to achieve an extremely high network scalability while degrading the key sharing probability. For this, we propose an efficient unital-based key pre-distribution in order to maintain a good key sharing probability while enhancing the network scalability. We provide analytical analysis and show that our approach enhances considerably the network scalability compared to existing solutions while providing good overall performances. Moreover, we show that given a network size, our solution reduces significantly the key ring size and then the storage overhead compared to existing solutions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We define in section 2 the metrics used to evaluate and compare key pre-distribution schemes and we summarize the used symbols. Section 3 presents some related works on symmetric key pre-distribution schemes for WSN. We give in section 4 a background on unital design while we present, in section 5, the basic mapping to key predistribution and analyze the performances of the resulting scheme. In section 6, we present the new scalable unitalbased key pre-distribution scheme. In section 7, we evaluate the performances of the proposed approach and compare it to some existing solutions. Finally, section 8 ends up this paper with some conclusions.
II. EVALUATION METRICS AND USED SYMBOLS
In this work, we consider mainly three metrics to compare performances of our solutions against existing ones: i) Network scalability : represents the maximum number of generated key rings which corresponds to the maximum number of supported nodes. A large scale secure deployment of WSN relies strongly on this performance metric.
ii) Storage overhead : measures the memory required to store keys in each node. Because of their small size, sensor nodes are very constrained in term of memory resource and this metric is challenging. We focus, in this work, on the memory required to store keys and we omit the memory required to store the key identifiers when they are necessary. The key identifier size can be computed as the 2-logarithm of the maximum number of keys used by the protocol which is negligible compared to the key size.
iii) Probability of sharing a session key: computed as the probability that a given pair of neighboring nodes are able to establish a direct secure link through one or more common shared pre-deployed keys. This metric can also be seen as the fraction of secured direct links among possible links in the network.
We summarize in table I the main symbols that we use in the remainder of this paper: Key management problem in WSN has been extensively studied in the literature [2] and several symmetric key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed. Eschenauer and Gligor proposed in [3] the basic Random Key Predistribution scheme denoted by RKP. In this scheme, each node is pre-loaded with a key ring of k keys randomly selected from a large pool S of keys. After the deployment step, each node exchanges with each of its neighbors the list of key identifiers that it maintains in order to identify the common keys. If two neighbors share at least one key, they establish a secure link and consider their session key as one of the common keys. Otherwise, they should determine secure paths which are composed of successive secure links.
Chan et al. proposed in [4] the Q-composite scheme which enhances the resilience of RKP. In this solution, two neighboring nodes can establish a secure link only if they share at least Q keys. The pairwise session key is calculated as the hash of all shared keys concatenated to each other. This approach enhances the resilience against node capture attacks because the attacker needs more overlap keys to break a secure link. However, it degrades the probability of session key sharing because neighboring nodes must have at least Q common keys to establish a secure link.
Du et al. proposed in [5] an enhanced random scheme assuming the node deployment knowledge. Nodes are organized in regional groups to which are assigned different key pools, each node selects its keys from the corresponding key pool. The key pools are constructed in such a way that neighboring ones share more keys than distant pools. This approach allows to enhance the probability of sharing common keys as well as the resilience against node capture attacks. However, the application of this scheme is restrictive if the deployment knowledge is not possible.
In [6] , Liu and Ning proposed a key management scheme in which nodes are pre-loaded with bivariate polynomials instead of keys. A global pool of symmetric bivariate polynomials (f (x, y) = f (y, x)) is generated off-line and each node i is pre-loaded with a subset of polynomials f (i, y). If two neighboring nodes share a common polynomial, the session key is derived by computing the polynomial value at the neighbor identifier. This approach allows to compute distinct secret keys which enhances the resilience against node capture. However, it requires more memory to store the polynomials and induces more computational overhead.
In [7] , Blom proposed a λ-secure symmetric key generation system in which each node i stores a column i and a row i of size (λ + 1) of two matrices G and (D.G) T respectively where : D (λ+1)×(λ+1) is a symmetric matrix, G (λ+1)×n is a public matrix and (D.G)
T is a secret matrix. The matrix of pairwise keys of a group of n nodes is then K = (D.G) T .G. Yu and Guan [8] used the Blom's scheme to key pre-distribution in group-based WSN. Nodes are deployed into a grid and to each group is assigned a distinct secret matrix. Using deployment knowledge, the potential number of neighboring nodes decreases which requires less memory. The application of this solution is restrictive if the deployment knowledge is not possible.
Liu et al. proposed in [9] the SBK scheme in which they distinguish two kinds of nodes: service nodes and worker ones. After the deployment, service nodes generate a key space using a bivariate polynomial-based or a matrix-based model. Then, they distribute the corresponding keying shares to few worker nodes. Authors propose to use for that a computationally asymmetric channel while shifting the large amount of computation overhead to service nodes which are sacrificed. SBK assumes that all nodes are deployed at the same time and that they are coarsely time synchronized to start the bootstrapping procedure simultaneously. It assumes also that no active attacks can be launched during the bootstrapping procedure. SBK gives good performances as far as the assumptions are verified.
Deterministic key pre-distribution schemes ensure that each node is able to establish a pairwise session key with all its neighbors. A naive deterministic key pre-distribution scheme can be designed by assigning to each link (i,j) a distinct key K i,j and pre-loading each node with (n − 1) pairwise keys in which it is involved where n is the network size. It is obvious that this solution is not scalable for large WSN. Choi et al. proposed in [10] an enhanced approach allowing to store only (n + 1)/2 keys at each node. For that purpose, they propose to establish an order relation between node identifiers and propose a hash function based key establishment in order to store only half of the node symmetric keys while computing the other half at each node. This approach allows to reduce the required stored keys to the half of network size, however, it is obvious that this scheme remains non scalable enough.
LEAP [11] makes use of a common transitory key which is preloaded into all nodes prior to deployment of the WSN. The transitory key is used to generate pairwise session keys and is cleared by the end of a short time interval after the deployment. LEAP is based on the assumption that a sensor node is secure during a time T min after its deployment and cannot be compromised during this period of time. LEAP is then secure as far as this assumption is verified.
In [12] , Ç amtepe and Yener proposed a new deterministic key pre-distribution scheme based on Symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design (SBIBD). The proposed mapping from SBIBD to key pre-distribution allows to construct m 2 + m + 1 key rings from a key pool S of m 2 + m + 1 keys such that each key ring contains k = m + 1 keys and each two key rings shares exactly one common key. The main strength of the Ç amtepe scheme is the total secure connectivity, indeed each two nodes share exactly one common key. However, the SBIBD scheme does not scale to very large networks. Indeed, using key rings of m + 1 keys we can generate only m 2 + m + 1 key rings. SBIBD based key pre-distribution was also used in [13] to guarantee intra-region secure communications in grid group WSN.
In [14] , Ruj et al. propose a trade-based key management scheme. Given a finite set X of v elements, a Steiner trade t − (v, k) is defined to be two disjoint sets T 1 and T 2 of kelements blocks of X such that each set of t elements from X occurs in precisely the same number of blocks of T 1 as those of T 2 , and no set of t elements from X is repeated more than once in any of T 1 or T 2 . A steiner trade is said to be strong if any two blocks of T 1 and T 2 respectively intersects in at most two elements. Authors proposed a new trade construction: Having q a prime power and k (4 ≤ k < q), they construct T 1 and T 2 while the blocks of T 1 are represented by t
where 0 ≤ i, j < q, and the blocks of T 2 are represented by t
Authors proved that the proposed construction results in a 2 − (qk, k) strong steiner trade. They proposed then a mapping to key pre-distribution where they associate to each element a distinct key and to each block of T 1 and T 2 a key ring. The key ring size is then equal to k and the scalability of the scheme is equal to 2q 2 . After the deployment step, each two nodes can establish a direct secure link if they share exactly two common keys which are used to compute the pairwise session key. Based on the trade properties, authors prove that each pair of keys occurs either in exactly two nodes from T 1 and T 2 respectively or none of the nodes. The main strength of the proposed scheme is the establishment of unique secret pairwise keys between connected nodes. However, this does not ensure a perfect network resilience. Indeed, the attacker may construct a part of the global set of keys and then compute pairwise secret keys used to secure external links where the compromised nodes are not involved. Moreover, the proposed scheme provides a low session key sharing probability which does not exceed 0.25 as we prove later.
We focus in this work on the scalability of key management schemes for WSN. Basic schemes giving a perfect network resilience [10] achieve a network scalability of O(k) where k is the key ring size. Design-based schemes as the SBIBD [12] and the trade [14] based ones allow to achieve a network scalability of O(k 2 ). In this work, we propose new solutions achieving a network scalability of 
IV. BACKGROUND: UNITAL DESIGN
In combinatorics, the design theory deals with the existence and construction of systems of finite sets whose intersections have specified properties. Formally, A t-design (ν, b, r, k, λ) is defined as follows: Given a finite set X of ν points (elements), we construct a family of b subsets of X, called blocks, such that each block has a size k, each point is contained in r blocks and each t points are contained together in exactly λ blocks. For instance, the SBIBD used in [12] and [13] Each pair of points is contained together in exactly one block [15] . We note the Unital as a 2−design(m 3 +1, m 2 (m 2 −m+1), m 2 , m+1, 1) or as (m 3 +1, m+1, 1) design for simplicity sake. Without loss of generality, we focus in this paper on Hermitian Unitals which exist for all m a prime power. Other constructions for m not a prime power exist in literature [15] . Some Hermitian unital construction approaches were proposed in the literature [16] [17] . A unital may be represented by its v × b incidence matrix that we call M . In this matrix, rows represent the points P i and columns represent blocks B j . The matrix M is then defined as:
We give in figure 1 an incidence matrix of a 2-(9,3,1) hermitian unital consisting of 12 blocks of a set of 9 points.
V. A BASIC MAPPING FROM UNITALS TO KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION FOR WSN At the best of our knowledge, we are the first who propose the use of unital design for key pre-distribution in WSN. Our schemes may also be generalized to all resource constrained wireless networks where key pre-distribution should be useful. In this section, we propose a basic mapping from unitals to key pre-distribution, we associate to each point of the unital a distinct key, to the global set of points the key pool and to each block a node key ring (see table II 
Before the deployment phase, we propose to generate the unital blocks corresponding to key rings and to preload each node with a distinct key ring as well as the key identifiers. After the deployment step, each two neighboring nodes exchange their key identifiers in order to determine eventual common key. Using this basic approach, each two nodes share at most one common key. Indeed, referring to the unital properties, each pair of keys is contained together in exactly one block which implies that two blocks cannot share more than one point. Hence, if two neighboring nodes share one common key, the latter is used as a pairwise key to secure the link; otherwise, nodes should determine secure paths which are composed of successive secure links.
A. Storage Overhead
When using a naive m order unital based scheme, each node is pre-loaded with one key ring corresponding to one block from the design. Hence, each node is pre-loaded with (m + 1) disjoint keys. The memory required to store keys is then l × (m + 1) where l is the key size.
B. Network Scalability
From construction, the total number of possible key rings when using the naive unital based scheme is n =
, this is then the maximum number of supported nodes.
C. Session Key Sharing Probability
When using the basic unital mapping, we know that each key is used in exactly m 2 key rings among the m 2 × (m 2 − m + 1) possible key rings. Let us consider two nodes i and j randomly selected. The node i is pre-loaded with a key ring KR i of m + 1 different keys. Each of them is contained in m 2 −1 other key rings. Knowing that each two keys occur together in exactly one block, we find that the blocks containing two different keys of KR i are completely disjoint. Hence, each node shares exactly one key with (m+ 1) × (m 2 − 1) nodes among the m 2 (m 2 − m + 1) − 1 other nodes. Then, the probability of sharing a common key is:
D. Summary and Discussion
The evaluation shows clearly that the basic mapping from unitals to key pre-distribution improves greatly the network scalability which reaches O(k 4 ) compared to other design-based schemes like SBIBD and trade ones having a scalability of O(k 2 ) where k is the key ring size. Moreover, given a network size n, this naive scheme allows to reduce the key ring size up to O( 4 √ n). However, this naive solution degrades the key sharing probability which tends to O( 1 k ). In order to improve the key sharing probability of the naive unital based scheme while maintaining a good scalability improvement, we propose in the next section an enhanced unital-based key pre-distribution for WSN.
VI. A NEW SCALABLE UNITAL-BASED KEY
PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME FOR WSN In this section, we present a new unital-based key predistribution scheme for WSN which enhances the key sharing probability while maintaining high network scalability. Before the deployment step, we propose to generate blocks of a unital design of order m, each block matches a key set. We propose then to pre-load each node with t completely disjoint blocks in the aim of enhancing the key sharing probability between neighboring nodes, t is then a protocol parameter that we will discuss later. We propose in algorithm 1 a random block distribution allowing to pre-load t disjoint blocks in each sensor node. After the deployment step, each two neighbors exchange their key identifiers in order to determine common keys. Contrary to the basic approach, each two nodes may share more than one key when using the proposed construction. Indeed, each node is pre-loaded with t disjoint blocks which means that each two nodes share up to t 2 keys. If two nodes share one or more keys, we propose to compute the pairwise secret key as the hash of all their common keys concatenated to each other. This approach allows to enhance the network resiliency since the attacker needs more overlap keys to break a secure link. Otherwise, when neighbors do not share any key, they should find a secure path composed of successive secure links. The major advantage of this scheme is the improvement of the key sharing probability as we will show later. Moreover, it increases the network resiliency through the composite pairwise secret keys witch reinforce secure links. In addition, we show that we maintain high network scalability compared to existing solutions although it remains lower than that of the naive version.
VII. EVALUATION & COMPARISON
In this section, we evaluate the performances of the enhanced unital-based scheme and compare it to the naive one and to the main existing solutions. We focus in comparisons on the design-based schemes and mainly the SBIBD and the trade-based ones. We denote in what follows by NU-KP the naive unital-based scheme and by t-UKP the enhanced unital-based scheme having t as parameter.
A. Storage overhead of the t-UKP scheme
When using a m order t-UKP scheme, each node is pre-loaded with t(m + 1) distinct keys. Indeed, from the construction, we notice that each t blocks of a key ring are completely disjoint and then do not intersect at any key. The memory required to store keys is then equal to l × t × (m + 1) where l is the key size.
B. Network scalability of the t-UKP scheme
Since each node is pre-loaded with t disjoint blocks from the m 2 × (m 2 − m + 1) possible blocks of a unital, it is obvious that the maximum number of key rings that we can reach is equal to n =
. This is the ideal case when all unital blocks are used. When using the random block pre-distribution presented in algorithm 1, we may generate a number of blocks slightly lower than this best value. We compute in what follows the minimum network size supported by the random blocks distribution.
Lemma 1: Given t ≥ 2, each set of (t−1)(m+1)(m 2 − 1) + t blocks from a unital design of order m contains at least one sub-set of t completely disjoint blocks.
Proof: As shown before, we know that each block of a unital design intersect with exactly (m+1)(m 2 −1) other blocks at one key. We prove the lemma by induction: for t = 2, let T be a set of (m + 1)(m 2 − 1) + 2 blocks of a unital design of order m and let us assume that each two blocks of T intersect at one point. So, each block of T intersects with the (m + 1)(m 2 − 1) + 1 other blocks in T which contradicts the fact that each block intersects with exactly (m + 1)(m 2 − 1) blocks of the global unital. Hence the proposition is true for t = 2. Let us now assume that the proposition is true at the order t and check whether it is for t + 1. Let T be a set of t(m + 1)(m T 0 . We deduce that T contains at least t + 1 completely disjoint blocks.
Proposition 1:
Using a unital design of order m, the algorithm 1 allows to generate at least
key rings, , where t is the number of disjoint blocks in each key ring.
Proof: Using a unital design of order m, the number of the generated blocks is equal to m 2 (m 2 − m + 1). From the algorithm construction, we know that each key ring contains exactly t disjoint blocks. Following the lemma 1, we find that the algorithm generates at least
C. Comparison of network scalability at equal key ring size
Based on the evaluation of the key ring size and the network scalability of the t-UKP scheme, We compare in figure 2 the average network scalability of t-UKP to that of the design-based schemes at equal key ring size. The network scalability of the SBIBD scheme is computed as m 2 + m + 1 where m + 1 is the key ring size. We compute the salability of the trade-based scheme as 2q 2 where q is the first prime power greater than the key ring size k, this value allows a achieve the best session key sharing probability using the trade scheme as we prove later.
The figure 2 shows that at equal key ring size, the naive unital key pre-distribution scheme allows to enhance greatly the scalability compared to the other schemes; for instance the increase factor reaches 10000 compared to the SBIBD-KP scheme when the key ring size exceeds 100. Moreover, the figure shows that the t-UKP schemes achieve a high network scalability. We notice that higher is t lower is the network scalability of t-UKP. Nevertheless, our solution gives better results than those of the SBIBD and the trade based solutions. For instance the 3-UKP scheme reaches a better network scalability than the SBIBD-KP and trade-KP ones when the key ring size is greater than 30. The increase factor reaches about 40 over the SBIBD-KP scheme and 20 over the trade-KP one when the key ring size exceeds 100. 
D. Key ring size at equal network size
In this subsection, we evaluate and compare the required key ring size when using the unital-based, the SBIBD-KP and the trade-KP schemes at equal network size. We compute for each network size the design order allowing to achieve the desired scalability and we deduce then the key ring size, the obtained results are reported in figure  3 . The figure shows that at equal network scalability, the naive unital based scheme allows to reduce extremely the key ring size and then the storage overhead. Indeed the enhancement factor over the SBIBD reaches 20. When using the t-UKP schemes, the figure shows that higher is t, higher is the required key ring size. However, this value remains significantly lower than the required key ring size of the SBIBD-KP and Trade-KP schemes.
E. Session key sharing probability of the t-UKP Scheme
We compute in this subsection the key sharing probability of the enhanced unital-based scheme and we show the improvement over the naive mapping.
Proposition 2: Given t ≥ 2, using t-UKP scheme of order m, the key sharing probability between any two nodes P c is given by:
Proof: Let us consider two randomly selected nodes i and j. Each node is pre-loaded with a key ring containing t disjoint unital blocks: (1), we find that the probability that two blocks B i,p and B j,q share one key is (m+1) 2 m 3 +m+1 . The probability that they don't share any key is then
Since all blocks of node i as well as those of node j are completely disjoint thanks to the proposed construction, the probability that the two nodes i and j do not share any key is then given by: 
The probability that two nodes share at least one key is then:
F. Comparison of session key sharing probability
We compare in this subsection, the session key sharing probability of the unital-based schemes to those of the SBIBD-KP and the Trade-KP ones. We prove in appendix A that the key sharing probability of the Ruj et al. Trade-KP scheme [14] is equal to
where 4 ≤ k < q and q is a prime power. k is the key ring size and we chose q to be the first prime power greater than k which ensures the best key sharing probability.
We plot in figure 4 the obtained results. The figure shows that the naive unital-based key pre-distribution provides a bad secure connectivity which decreases significantly when the key ring size increases. Otherwise, the obtained results show that the key sharing probability is significantly enhanced when t is high. The figure shows that higher is t, better is the key sharing probability. Indeed, loading nodes with many blocks from unital design allows to increase significantly the key sharing probability. For instance 5-UKP allows to achieve key sharing probability of 0.6 when the key ring size is 150, the same key sharing probability is reached by the enhanced scheme with t = 4 when the key ring size is equal to 80. Although the enhanced unital-based scheme increases significantly the network scalability over the SBIBD based scheme as shown before, the resulting key sharing probability remains lower compared to SBIBD based solution which guarantees a total connectivity. However, our scheme allows to attend a total secure connectivity thanks to the secure path establishment.
G. Choice of the t value
As shown before, the pre-distribution of t unital blocks in each node instead of one allows at the same time enhancing the key sharing probability and computing composite pairwise secret keys witch reinforces secure links. On the other hand, it multiplies the storage overhead and decreases the network scalability over the naive version. The choice of the t value depends then on the application requirement in order to obtain the best tradeoff. Indeed, when we do not need to establish a secure link between each pair of nodes or when the length of secure paths is not a major concern, low values of t can be chosen. For instance, in many-to one WSN where the key sharing requirement is reduced to the child-parent relationship, low values of t can be used in order to reach an extremely high scalable deployment. On the other hand, when the key sharing probability and the length of secure paths are major concerns, t should be given a high value which allows to ensure a good key sharing probability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We proposed, in this paper, a new scalable key predistribution scheme for WSN. We make use, for the first time, of the unital design theory. We showed that a basic mapping from unitals to key pre-distribution allows to achieve an extremely high network scalability while degrading the key sharing probability. Then, we proposed an enhanced unital-based key pre-distribution, called t-UKP, which provides high network scalability and good session key sharing probability. We conducted analytical analysis to compare our solutions to existing ones, results showed that our approach enhances significantly the network scalability while providing good overall performances.
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APPENDIX A SESSION KEY SHARING PROBABILITY USING THE TRADE-KP SCHEME We compute in what follows the session key sharing probability of the trade-based scheme proposed in [14] . The Ruj et al. trade construction allows to generate two sets T 1 and T 2 of q 2 key rings each one. Each key ring contains k keys.We recall also that two nodes can establish a secure session key if they share exactly two common keys. Following the 2-steiner trade property, we know that each pair of keys occurs at most once in T 1 and at most once in T 2 . This means that each two key rings from T 1 have no pair of shared keys and each two key rings from T 2 have no pair of shared keys also.
Let us now take a key ring from T 1 , we know that it contains exactly k keys and so k 2 possible pair of keys.
Following the construction, we find that the selected key ring shares each couple of keys with exactly one other key ring from T 2 . So each two key rings selected from T 1 and T 2 respectively share a couple of keys with a probability k 2 q 2
In the general case, if we consider two key rings KR i and KR j randomly selected from T 1 ∪ T 2 , the probability that they share a pair of keys which is the probability that they can establish a secure link is given by:
